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Introduction
Since 1945, more than 70 civil wars have occurred around the world, resulting in approximately 20 million deaths and displacing more than 67 million people.
1 Understanding the causes of the onset and continuation of such conflicts is therefore of great importance, and the analysis of the determinants of civil conflict has been the subject of a recent and growing literature in economics.
2 There have been several cross-country studies of the proximate correlates of civil war: Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) both find that poorer countries face a greater risk of civil conflict. Miguel et al. (2004) use instrumental variable analysis to corroborate this view that lower economic growth leads to more conflict. However, this finding is subject to varying interpretations: while Collier and Hoeffler (2004) interpret poverty as proxying for the opportunity cost of rebel recruitment, Fearon and Laitin (2003) emphasize the lack of state capacity in poor countries. These studies also differ in their findings on the impact of other factors: Collier and Hoeffler find that civil conflicts are more likely in countries which are dominated by one ethnic group and which have a larger stock of easily expropriated primary commodities, while the other two studies find no impact of ethnic divisions or primary commodities on the likelihood of conflict.
The results from cross-country studies are subject to the caveat that civil conflict in one country might have very different causes and characteristics than conflict in another.
3 Further, the data on civil conflicts and other variables may not be strictly comparable across countries (Sambanis, 2004) . There have been a few within-country studies of civil conflict. Barron et al. (2004) examine village-level conflicts in Indonesia, while Deininger (2004) examines the causes and consequences of civil strife in Uganda. However, both these studies focus on a local level of conflict and construct measures of conflict based on subjective interviews.
They do not study organized conflict like insurgencies or civil wars, and hence are not strictly comparable to the cross-country studies. The set of case studies in Collier and Sambanis (2005) 1 provide richer and more detailed within-country qualitative studies to complement the crosscountry large-sample studies; however, they are not strictly comparable to the cross-country regression-based analyses.
Our study examines violent conflict within one country, Nepal, and applies the crosscountry regression methodology to a within-country context. This approach mitigates many of the concerns regarding cross-country analysis: first, since we are able to study the spread of the same conflict to different parts of the country, several variables which differ across countries such as the existing political system, the aims of the rebel movement or the involvement of other countries, are held constant in such a study. One implication of such approach is that we are not able to examine the impact of these factors, which can be quite important in many contexts. However, these variables are typically not controlled for in many cross-country analyses of conflict. 4 Second, we are able to construct finer measures of conflict intensity based on the number of casualties and other human rights abuses, rather than just using a dummy variable for whether an area experiences conflict or not. Third, we are also able to separately analyze conflict-related deaths caused by activist forces and by the state, and study the evolution of the conflict intensity over time (cross-country studies usually do not go further than dating the onset and end of civil wars). Fourth, we go beyond existing empirical analyses of the conflict in Nepal (Murshed and Gates, 2005; Bohara et al., 2006; Acharya, 2007) by constructing detailed measures of social divisions, based both on caste and linguistic diversity in the country, and by focusing on the role of poverty.
Starting in 1996, Nepal was affected by the "People's War" started by Maoist activists, whose main aim was to establish a republic and change the Constitution. The activists used guerilla warfare techniques to attack government facilities and officials. This conflict spread to all parts of the country, and resulted in a death toll of more than 13,000 people nationwide. Large parts of rural Nepal were under the control of the activists, though the district headquarters remained under the control of the state. In 2006, the Maoists began peace talks with the government. 4 An exception is Sambanis (2001) , which examines the role of neighboring country characteristics on civil war incidence.
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In our empirical analysis, we consider a wide range of economic and social variables which are hypothesized to affect the likelihood of violent conflict, including geographic characteristics, economic development, social diversity and government investment in infrastructure. We find that geographic conditions (presence of mountains and forests) explain a quarter of the cross-district variation in conflict intensity. Controlling for geography, the lack of economic opportunities, measured by higher poverty or lower literacy rates, is significantly and robustly associated with a higher intensity of violent conflict: a 10 percentage point increase in poverty is associated with 23-25 additional conflict-related deaths. Poverty is significantly associated both with the onset of the conflict, as well as its continuation. However, this relationship is not constant over time: both state forces and Maoist activists inflict the greatest casualties in the poorest areas in 2002, when the conflict escalated. As the activists gained control of the poorest areas over time, the highest levels of conflict-related deaths were experienced in the somewhat better-off areas. There is some evidence that greater social polarization (measured by the caste diversity of Nepalese society) is associated with higher levels of conflict. However, this relationship is much less robust than the relationship with poverty; in fact, part of this relationship appears to be due to the fact that social polarization contributes to greater poverty, perhaps by limiting access to economic opportunities for the lower castes. Measures of linguistic polarization or fractionalization have no significant impact on conflict intensity.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a brief description of the "People's
War" in Nepal, section 3 describes the main hypotheses we examine and the related literature on the Nepalese conflict. Section 4 describes our data and empirical strategy, section 5 summarizes our findings and section 6 concludes. 
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[4] Weatherhead Center for International Affairs similar activist groups in India; the 75 point manifesto promised to support all groups fighting against "Indian expansionism". Estimates of the size of the activist forces varied widely from 7,000-10,000 (Bray et al, 2003) to 10,000-15,000 (BBC report). They were mainly financed by armed raids on banks, as well as taxes on the local population and remittances from abroad.
The Maoists were reported to have set up local governments and local courts in some of the areas under their control.
In the first few years of the insurgency, the response from the government was to use the existing law and order framework to address the problem; more than 1000 people were reported to have been arrested and tortured by the government in 1999 (INSEC, 1999) . In several areas, the state attempted to suppress activist activity: the graph in Figure 1 shows that in 1998
and 1999, more people were killed by the state than by the Maoist activists. The total number of casualties claimed by the "People's War" amounts to more than 13,000. There is considerable variation in the intensity of conflict in different regions of Nepal.
The number of casualties is highest in the mid-Western region where the conflict began, with more than 4,000 deaths between February 1996 and December 2004. In contrast, the Eastern Development region has suffered less than 1,500 casualties in the same period. The map in Figure 2 shows this variation in the intensity of the conflict, while Figure 3 shows the spread of conflict over time. The next section considers some hypotheses about which areas might be more prone to civil conflict.
Possible causes of civil conflict
There is some diversity of views regarding the causes of the conflict in Nepal. Some reports and studies have suggested that the Maoist conflict has found support from the oppressed lower castes (Bray et al., 2003) , portraying the insurgency as stemming from "rage against a 6 long legacy of oppression based on caste and ethnicity" (Sengupta, 2005 rents from immovable assets (e.g. oil resources) can be easily extracted. They find some support for their framework in cross-country regression analysis; however, the pure "opportunity cost" view of natural resources has been challenged and further refined both by case studies (Collier and Sambanis, 2005) and by more detailed regression analysis (Humphreys, 2005) .
Fearon (2005) presents an alternative model of insurgency and state response, in which the link with poverty happens through much more indirect channels, since a lower opportunity cost also means lower gains from winning the conflict. Fearon and Laitin (2003) focus on 7 Deraniyagala (2005) is a descriptive study without systematic empirical analysis at the district level.
Murshed and Gates (2005) documents the differences in income across various caste categories, but does not investigate the impact of these social divisions on conflict intensity. The estimates in this study also suffer from multicollinearity, since the authors include schooling, life expectancy and the Human Development Index in the same regression.
7 the conditions which specifically favor insurgency. Since insurgents are usually numerically weak compared to the governments they are fighting against, they must be able to hide from government forces and be able to garner local support for their activities. This suggests a number of testable hypotheses: first, the presence of mountainous or forested terrain, poorly served by roads, should increase insurgency. Second, insurgency should be more common in rural areas with low migration, where the rebels can easily punish people who do not support them. Third, the need to form a cohesive fighting force implies that insurgencies should be less common in areas of greater linguistic diversity and fewer means of communication.
Several cross-country studies have suggested that diverse societies are more prone to conflict (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Horowitz, 1985) . Collier and Hoeffler (2004) also lay out a "grievance" framework, where the presence of different ethnic groups is likely to lead to the presence of significant animosity between groups; this is especially likely when one ethnic group tends to dominate over the others. Lee et al. (2004) find that the impact of democratization on human rights is limited by the presence of ethnic minorities. Several studies including Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) and Miguel and Gugerty (2005) have also documented the inability of diverse societies to work together to obtain public goods.
Nepal has a very diverse society in several dimensions. Although the majority of the population is Hindu, there are deep caste divisions in the Nepalese society. Discrimination and human rights abuses against the lower castes are not uncommon (Human Rights Watch, 2004) .
Hence, in the Nepalese context, the grievance hypothesis suggests that areas with greater caste diversity or a greater dominance of high castes should have more conflict. Nepal also has considerable linguistic diversity, with only 60% of the population speaking Nepali. While other empirical analyses of the Nepal conflict (Bohara et al, 2006; Acharya, 2007) focus on the proportion of people who speak Nepali as a measure of social diversity, they do not construct polarization or fractionalization measures similar to the cross-country studies of civil war.
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These prior studies also do not examine the role of caste divisions at all.
8 Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) discuss the concept, measurement and estimation of polarization in detail.
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Data sources
We conduct our analysis using district-level data. Nepal has 5 major regions and 75 districts.
A district can be thought of as being comparable to a county in the US in the sense that it is administratively below the region level. The average area of a district was 1948 Profiles based on official data. Details of data sources and variable construction are provided in the Data Appendix. As far as possible, these measures have been constructed using data collected before the violent conflict began in 1996. This helps to partially mitigate the concerns regarding backward causality, such as the possibility that the conflict itself has made some areas poorer or reduced the availability of public goods.
As suggested by the opportunity cost hypothesis, we construct district-level measures of poverty and literacy to proxy for the opportunity cost of recruiting rebel forces. We also have measures of district-level infrastructure such as the number of post offices, schools, banks and health posts. Nepal has very few natural resources which can be easily expropriated (such as oil or diamonds); the only natural resource which the Maoists have expressed an interest in controlling is land. To capture geographic characteristics which make insurgency easier, we use the altitude (elevation) of the district to indicate the presence of hilly territory, as well as the proportion of district area which is forested. We construct a measure of the presence of roads as the total kilometers of road length, normalized by the area of the district. We also construct measures of government investment by looking at the change in the provision of roads and post offices in the 1990s.
To measure the extent of social divisions, we use information on the caste and language divisions in Nepalese society. We collected data on the number of people in different caste groups, as well as speaking different languages from the census of 2001. 10 We consider all castes which constitute more than 1% of the population. This gives us 76 categories, which we use to construct a diversity index. The index we use is the measure of polarization, proposed by Esteban and Ray (1994) . Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) find that ethnic polarization is highly correlated with the incidence of civil war in cross-country data.
11 This index attains a maximum value of 1, when the society is divided into two equal-sized groups, thus maximizing the chances of conflict. The index attains a minimum value of zero, either when the society is completely homogenous, or when every single person belongs to a different group. We also compute a measure of caste fractionalization, similar to the ethno-linguistic fractionalization measures used in several cross-country studies. This fractionalization measure captures the probability that two randomly selected persons would belong to different caste groups. We also use two alternative measures for the dominance of upper castes (Brahmins, Chhetris, Thakuris and Newars) in the district: one is simply the proportion of these castes in the population, and the second is a dummy which equals one if the proportion of these castes is between 45% and 90%.
10 We were unable to get this at the district level from the pre-conflict 1991 census; however, the nationwide proportions have changed very little between 1991 and 2001. 11 See the Data Appendix for the details of the construction of the index.
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Around 120 different languages are spoken in Nepal, some by very small numbers of people.
We construct a polarization index as well as a fractionalization index of linguistic diversity (similar to the ones computed for caste divisions), using all languages which are spoken by more than 1% of the population. Since the national language Nepali is the single most spoken language, it might be easier to easier to mobilize forces in Nepali-speaking areas. We thus include the proportion speaking Nepali as another measure of the ease of mobilization.
We should note that caste polarization is highly correlated with the fraction of people who speak Nepali, since the high castes tend to be Nepali-speaking. On the other hand, caste polarization is negatively correlated with linguistic polarization, suggesting that these are two different dimensions of diversity. Table 1 shows the mean of our variables. We note the large variation across districts both in the measures of conflict intensity, as well as in the potential explanatory variables. More than half of all districts have experienced 100 or more conflict-related deaths during 1996-2004, and one-third of all districts have experienced more than 150 deaths. There are also a large number of abductions by the Maoists, which probably reflects forced conscription into their ranks. We also note that, on average, 42% of the population was below the poverty line in Nepal at the time the conflict began. Table 2 shows a correlation matrix between our measures of conflict and other variables. The next section uses regressions to investigate these correlations further.
Empirical analysis of conflict
We investigate the proximate correlates of the Maoist conflict in Nepal by running regressions of the following form:
in which Conf lict i is a measure of the intensity of conflict in district i, while X i is a vector of pre-conflict district-level characteristics. As mentioned above, our main measure of conflict intensity is the number of conflict-related deaths in the district from 1996 to 2004, normalized by the population of the district. All the specifications shown exclude the districts of Rolpa and Rukum, where the Maoist insurgency had its beginnings. This is because these districts have a very large number of deaths compared to other places (i.e. they are statistical outliers), and because they have other characteristics, including the long-standing presence of Communist activists, which probably helped to spark the Maoist movement. In this sense, our analysis focuses not on the onset, but on the spread of the conflict in the other regions of Nepal.
Main results
Our main results are summarized in Table 3 . Geographical factors such as elevation and the presence of forested area explain 25% of the variation in the intensity of conflict across districts (column (1)).
12 Column (2) shows that the pre-conflict poverty level of the district is a significant predictor of the intensity of conflict. Columns (3)- (5) Re-running these regressions with literacy rates instead of poverty (a measure of current as well as future earnings potential) yields results confirming that economic backwardness is associated with higher levels of conflict (columns (6) and (7)). Areas with higher literacy rates are less prone to conflict; however, now we also find caste polarization to be significantly correlated with the incidence of conflict, while the proportion of advantaged castes is marginally
significant. An 11 percentage point (one standard deviation) increase in literacy rates is associated with an decrease of 65 conflict-related deaths, while a one standard-deviation increase in caste polarization is associated with an increase of 34 conflict-related deaths (column (6) estimates). Replacing poverty by a measure of infrastructure (road length per sq. km) also yields a similar result: presence of infrastructure is associated with lower conflict (columns (8) and (9)). It is interesting to note that elevation becomes insignificant when we include the road length variable, suggesting that part of the correlation with elevation arises because of the difficulty of building roads in hilly areas. 14 We also show results with all these variables as regressors (though these are highly correlated with each other) in column (10).
Why do poorer areas witness a higher level of conflict-related deaths? There can be several potential reasons for this: first, consistent with the opportunity-cost view, the rebels 
and (5) are 24, 24 and 23 respectively. 14 Elevation and road length are significantly negatively correlated.
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[13] Do & Iyer find it easier to recruit people to their cause in poorer areas. Second, it could be the case that the government spends more resources to prevent activist activity in richer areas (through information-gathering and methods other than killing a lot of suspects), so that the number of deaths is lower in these areas. Alternatively, it could be that the state has a lower opportunity cost of violent repression in poorer areas. Third, for the same level of Maoist and state activity, poorer people are more likely to get killed since they have fewer means to protect themselves or to move away from the scene of the conflict (the "collateral damage" view).
We are at this stage unable to distinguish fully between these alternatives. Looking at the number of abductions by the Maoists (presumably to forcibly recruit people for their side),
we find the evidence to be ambiguous: poverty is not significant in explaining the number of abductions, while literacy is (Table 5 , columns (7) and (8)). 
Robustness checks
Appendix Table A1 runs the specification of Table 3 , column (4), replacing the poverty measure with other measures of under-development and infrastructure availability: infant mortality rates, the number of schools, health posts, post offices and banks (all normalized by district population), as well as the change in the number of post offices and road length in the 1990's as a crude measure of government investment in these areas. Our results on poverty
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[14] Weatherhead Center for International Affairs appear to be robust in the sense that only the measures which are significantly correlated with district poverty (infant mortality, number of banks, change in road length and change in number of post offices) appear to be significant predictors of conflict intensity.
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Appendix Table A2 checks the robustness of our results to different measures of caste and language divisions: caste and linguistic fractionalization measures, the proportion speaking Nepali and an advantaged caste dominance dummy (which equals 1 if the proportion of advantaged castes is between 45% and 90%). 16,17 All these measures are statistically insignificant in predicting the intensity of conflict, except for the proportion speaking Nepali when we use the literacy rate as a measure of economic opportunities.
Appendix Table A3 adds additional control variables: the male-female literacy difference to capture gender differences in society (columns (1) and (2)), 18 the average distance of the district from Rolpa and Rukum where the conflict started (columns (3) and (4)), and the average distance of the district headquarters from the capital Kathmandu, which might be a proxy both for remoteness of the district, as well as the strength of the state (columns (5) and (6)). The results are also robust to dropping the four most urbanized districts from our sample (columns (7) and (8)).
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Columns (9) and (10) correct our estimates for potential spatial correlation of errors, since there might be spillover effects from one district to another. The results are very similar to those obtained without such correction. We also ran specifications controlling for region fixed effects (the coefficient on poverty becomes statistically insignificant, but literacy remains 15 We also tried normalizing the number of schools, health posts, post offices and banks by the area of the district (rather than the population); in this case, all the infrastructure variables are highly significant predictors of the conflict. The results are available upon request.
16 Most of the cross-country literature uses a similar measure of ethno-linguistic fractionalization to capture social diversity, though the polarization measure is preferred on theoretical and predictive grounds (Esteban and Ray (2004) , Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) 15 strongly significant), as well as adjusting the standard errors for region-level clustering (both poverty and literacy remain significant at the 10% level of significance).
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It is interesting that, in almost all our specifications, the relationship with caste polarization disappears when we control for poverty measures, but not when we include literacy. One possibility is that the effect of social divisions works through poverty i.e. all else being equal, an area with greater social divisions has greater poverty. This could be, for instance, because of economic opportunities being denied to people of lower castes in a more polarized society, or because the distribution of assets or incomes is also more unequal in a more polarized society (resulting in a few rich people and a lot of poor people). Regressing the poverty measure on the caste polarization measure (Appendix Table A4 ) reveals a positive relationship, even after controlling for geography and literacy rates, suggesting that part of the relationship of caste polarization with conflict can be explained by its impact on poverty.
Onset versus intensity of conflict
In this section, we separate out the impact of poverty and social diversity on the onset of conflict, and the intensity of conflict, once it has begun. Esteban and Ray (2007) suggest that the relationship between polarization, fractionalization and conflict is likely to be highly non-linear; in particular, the relationship with the onset of conflict is likely to be different from the relationship with the intensity of conflict, once it has begun. Looking at Table 5, columns (1) and (2) show results from probit regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the district witnessed more than 100 conflict-related deaths. In addition to a robustness check on our conflict measure, this can also be interpreted as a measure of the onset of conflict in that district. Columns (3) and (4) show similar regressions for a dummy which equals one if the district had more than 150 conflict-related deaths. Columns (5) and (6) regress the log of the number of people killed on the log of total population as well as other covariates. In all cases, we find that poverty and literacy measures are strongly and significantly correlated with the incidence of conflict in the direction we expect. 20 These results are available upon request.
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The coefficient on caste polarization is negative and significant for the more-than-100-deaths dummy, suggesting that very high levels of polarization in fact raise the costs of conflict.
Columns (7) and (8) Here we find that the coefficient on poverty is positive but not significant, while the coefficient on literacy is significant; caste polarization is positive and significantly associated with the extent of abductions.
Columns (9)- (12) examine the impact of social and economic factors on the intensity of conflict, once it has started in a given region. We do this by running tobit regressions for the number of deaths per 1000 population, as well as the log number of deaths, provided these variables are above a certain threshold. 21 We find that poorer areas are not just more likely to experience conflict: they also experience a higher intensity of conflict, once conflict has started. We find that the relationship between caste polarization and conflict is non-linear:
polarization is negatively related to the incidence of conflict,but is not significantly associated with the intensity of the conflict, once it has started.
Relationship between poverty and conflict over time
Since we have annual data on conflict related deaths for 1999, 2002, 2003 and 2004, we can document the relationship between poverty and conflict intensity over time, and we find that this does not remain constant. Table 6 regresses year-wise conflict deaths on dummies for the bottom three quartiles of poverty (i.e. the omitted category is the top quartile or least poor people), as well as the top three quartiles of literacy (the omitted category is the least literate people). We find that poverty or literacy rates are not significantly associated with Maoist- 21 The threshold for the number of deaths per 1000 population is 0.25, which corresponds to the lowest quartile of its distribution.The threshold for the number of deaths is 100, which corresponds to the "onset" dummy in columns (1) and (2).
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[17] Do & Iyer (1) and (2)), while they are significantly associated with state-caused deaths in 1999 itself (columns (9) and (10) In 2003, the intensity of conflict is not higher in poorer areas (though high literacy areas still show significantly lower conflict). It is interesting that by 2004, when the activists had captured a good deal of territory, we see that the districts in the second quartile of poverty show slightly higher levels of conflict (columns (7) and (15) further implies that what we observe is not just "collateral damage" i.e. poor people getting killed in conflict simply because they cannot protect themselves.
Conclusion
We conduct a within-country empirical analysis of the correlates of conflict intensity in Nepal, analogous to cross-country analyses of civil wars. Our within-country approach enables us to examine the spread of a single conflict-across different parts of the country and over time.
We find that conflict intensity is higher in places with greater poverty, and in places with 18 geographical characteristics which favor insurgencies. The relationship of conflict intensity with measures of social diversity is much less robust: there is no significant association with measures of linguistic diversity, and part of the relationship with caste polarization appears to be because poverty is higher in more polarized areas, perhaps because social polarization limits the access to economic opportunities for members of the disadvantaged castes. Both deaths caused by the Maoists and those caused by the state are significantly higher in the poorest areas in the initial stages of the conflict. Over time, as Maoists gain control of the poorest areas, the highest intensity of conflict shifts from the poorest areas to somewhat better off places. The changing relationship with poverty suggests that we need to take into account the prior evolution of a conflict in broader analyses of conflict. The within-country analysis of conflict also raises some interesting questions: how do the parties in a conflict decide where to devote more resources to the conflict? Will the evolution of conflict always result in a steady state where one party wins outright? What are the circumstances under which conflict lasts for a long time? We hope to address these issues in future theoretical and empirical work. , where s i is the proportion of (caste or linguistic) group i in the population. The caste fractionalization measure is computed as
, where s i is the proportion of caste group i in the population. This represents the probability that two randomly drawn persons from the population belong to different caste groups.
Proportion of advantaged castes is computed as the proportion of district population belonging to the Brahmin, Chhetri, Thakuri or Newar castes. High caste dominance is a dummy which equals one if the proportion of advantaged castes is between 45 and 90 percent of the district population.
For measures of linguistic diversity, we use data from 2001 census on the number of people speaking different languages. We retain languages spoken by more than 1% of the population, and the remaining are put under "others" category. This gives us 13 different categories.
Linguistic polarization and fractionalization measures are computed similar to the caste polarization and fractionalization measures.
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